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Search Plans
Abstract
People often do not know where things are and have to look for them. This thesis presents a formal
model suitable for reasoning about how to find things and acting to find them, which I will call “search
behavior”. Since not knowing location of something can prevent an agent from reaching his desired goal,
the ability to plan and conduct a search will be argued to increase the variety of situations in which an
agent can succeed at his chosen task.
Searching for things is a natural problem that arises when the blocks world assumptions (which have
been the problem setting for most planning research) are modified by providing the agent only partial
knowledge of his environment. Since the agent does not know the total world state, actions may appear
to have nondeterministic effects. The significant aspects of the search problem which differ from
previously studied planning problems are the acquisition of information and iteration of similar actions
while exploring a search space.
Since introduction of the situation calculus [MH69], various systems have been proposed for representing
and reasoning about actions which involve knowledge acquisition and iteration, including Moore's work
on the interaction between knowledge and action [Moo80]. Such systems can be used to infer properties
of plans which have already been constructed, but do not themselves construct plans for complex
actions. My concern with searching has to do with a sense that Moore's knowledge preconditions are
overly restrictive. Morgenstern [Mor88] examined ways to weaken knowledge preconditions for an
individual agent by relying on the knowledge and abilities of other agents. Lesperance's research [Les91]
on indexical knowledge is another way of weakening the knowledge preconditions. I am trying to reduce
the amount of information an agent must know (provided he can search a known search space). If you
dial the right combination to a safe it will open, whether or not you knew in advance that it was the right
combination. Search is a way to guarantee you will eventually dial the right combination. So what I am
exploring is how to systematically construct a search that will use available knowledge to accomplish
something the agent does not currently know enough to do directly.
I claim it is possible for automated agents to engage in search behavior. Engaging in search behavior
consists in recognizing the need for a search, constructing an effective plan, and then carrying out that
plan. Expressing such a plan and reasoning about its effectiveness requires a representation language. I
will select a representation language based on criteria derived from analyzing the search planning
problem. Each of the three components of a system for engaging in search behavior will be designed and
implemented to demonstrate that an automated agent can find things when he needs to.
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Abstract
People often do not know where things are and have to look for them. This thesis presents
a formal model suitable for reasoning about how to nd things and acting to nd them,
which I will call \search behavior". Since not knowing location of something can prevent
an agent from reaching his desired goal, the ability to plan and conduct a search will be
argued to increase the variety of situations in which an agent can succeed at his chosen
task.
Searching for things is a natural problem that arises when the blocks world assumptions
(which have been the problem setting for most planning research) are modied by providing
the agent only partial knowledge of his environment. Since the agent does not know the
total world state, actions may appear to have nondeterministic e ects. The signicant
aspects of the search problem which di er from previously studied planning problems are
the acquisition of information and iteration of similar actions while exploring a search
space.
Since introduction of the situation calculus MH69], various systems have been proposed
for representing and reasoning about actions which involve knowledge acquisition and iteration, including Moore's work on the interaction between knowledge and action Moo80].
Such systems can be used to infer properties of plans which have already been constructed,
but do not themselves construct plans for complex actions. My concern with searching has
to do with a sense that Moore's knowledge preconditions are overly restrictive. Morgenstern Mor88] examined ways to weaken knowledge preconditions for an individual agent
by relying on the knowledge and abilities of other agents. Lesperance's research Les91] on
indexical knowledge is another way of weakening the knowledge preconditions. I am trying
to reduce the amount of information an agent must know (provided he can search a known
search space). If you dial the right combination to a safe it will open, whether or not you
knew in advance that it was the right combination. Search is a way to guarantee you will
eventually dial the right combination. So what I am exploring is how to systematically
construct a search that will use available knowledge to accomplish something the agent
does not currently know enough to do directly.
I claim it is possible for automated agents to engage in search behavior. Engaging
in search behavior consists in recognizing the need for a search, constructing an e ective
plan, and then carrying out that plan. Expressing such a plan and reasoning about its
e ectiveness requires a representation language. I will select a representation language
based on criteria derived from analyzing the search planning problem. Each of the three
components of a system for engaging in search behavior will be designed and implemented
to demonstrate that an automated agent can nd things when he needs to.
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Chapter 1

Finding something
People often do not know where things are and have to look for them. Or they are
given a generic description of where something is and have to look for it. Even if robots,
like elephants, never forget, our ways of communicating locations are such that robots
instructed by people are going to have to look for things.
This thesis presents a formal model suitable for reasoning about how to nd things and
acting to nd them, which I will call \search behavior". Since not knowing something's
location can prevent agents from reaching their desired goals, the ability to plan and
conduct a search will be argued to increase the variety of situations in which an agent can
succeed at his chosen task.
Search is concerned with increasing an agent's awareness of his environment { the
agent acts to acquire knowledge of the location of an object. Conducting the search
may also require changing the state of the world, including agents moving themselves,
or removing various obstacles to their perception. Thus in search, two kinds of state
information must be represented and monitored: the agent's internal epistemic state and
the external environment state.
My research on search plans di ers from the considerable work that has been done on
ecient algorithms for search problems (see for example Knu68]) in that it is aimed at
identifying the reasoning process required of an automated agent to decide to conduct a
search and to monitor its progress. In contrast, work on search algorithms aims to achieve
eciency by compiling out the reasoning involved with monitoring a search and leave to
the programmer the decision of when to search. Planning has often been construed as a
search problem Kor87]. Here I construe physical search { that is, the process of looking
for things { as a planning problem.

1.1 The search planning problem
The research problem I am addressing is a planning problem. An agent has a goal to
achieve in an environment. The agent is able to perform several di erent actions and has
information about the e ects of di erent actions on the environment.
The original planning problem was to discover a sequence of actions which result in
the goal being satised when executed in the current environment. The planning problem
for search will require plans which have more complex structure than sequential ordering
1

(as will be argued in this chapter). Therefore, the agent is provided with additional plan
construction operators for forming sequential, conditional, or iterated plans.
Unlike the original planning problem, search involves discovering information about the
environment. The notion of environment must be enriched to distinguish what information
is known to the agent at any given time and what is unknown.
In its most general form, the search planning problem can be stated as discovering
a plan structure which will determine the truth (or falsity) of a goal proposition when
executed in the current environment. The search planning problem can also be viewed as
discovering a plan which will determine the identity of an object in the environment which
satises a goal property when executed in the current environment.
The rest of this chapter discusses these novel aspects of the search problem in more
detail. The requirement for additional control structure in plans is derived from attempts
to use existing planning techniques to solve the search planning problem.
One example of the search planning problem which is used throughout this proposal
to illustrate search behavior is an environment with a variety of containers which hide a
ball from the agent. The agent has the goal of locating the ball. In this example, the
containers provide the environmental device which is the basis for distinguishing what the
agent knows about the world from what it does not know.
To give the reader a sense of the class of search problems, a variety of other examples
are presented.
An area search uses the device of sweeping a limited perceptual sensor over an area of
the environment (larger than the area immediately perceivable to the agent) to explore a
search space. An illustration of area search is the behavior that a Coast Guard Search and
Rescue mission might undertake to scan a large area of ocean for missing boaters.
A kind of search which might be called a theory search might be used by an agent
attempting to answer the question, \Is it feasible for me to buy a house?" Information
which the agent can use to develop a theory for answering this question is initially hidden
from the agent in books. Reading various texts may provide direct answers to the goal
proposition, indirect answers which may be used to infer the truth of the goal proposition,
or secondary information about other texts.
An agent may be faced with a search problem when in a maze. The goal proposition
might be, \Can I exit this maze?" The walls immediately surrounding the agent in this
environment hide information about the rest of the maze. Similarly, when searching for an
object in a cluttered environment, obstacles other than containers may block the agent's
perception.
The rest of this proposal will focus on searches where the goal is to determine the
location of an object. Most examples will involve searching through containers for a ball,
which is one of the simplest kinds of search problems. The advantage of this instance of
the search problem is that geometric reasoning can be simplied if we consider that an
agent can see any object that is not inside a closed container. The dissertation will present
a general mechanism which can plan for all the above kinds of search.
2

1.2 Novel aspects of the search planning problem
From the perspective of planning, search plans constitute another step in the evolution of
plans from simple sequences of actions to structures which more closely resemble computer
programs. The planning problem for search di ers from earlier planning problems. The
earliest recognition of the distinct character of plans for search in the cognitive science
literature is in Miller et al. MGP60].
The original planning problem assumed certain properties about the behavior of the
environment in which an agent was acting and the agent's relation to that environment.
These assumptions are called the blocks world assumptions.
Only one agent is active in the environment { nothing else causes change.
That agent has total knowledge of the environment.
Actions are deterministic in their e ects
Searching for things is a natural problem that arises when the blocks world assumptions
are modied by providing the agent only partial knowledge of his environment.
Rather than relax the requirement that actions have deterministic e ects, I consider
the case that the agent may not have total knowledge of the environment. Since the agent
does not know the total world state, actions may appear to have nondeterministic e ects.
There is a subtle di erence between these two planning problems. Conditional planning is
an appropriate response to nondeterminism, but something more is necessary for epistemic
nondeterminism.

1.3 A scenario calling for a search plan
To introduce the notions of search knowledge and search plans, consider an agent who
knows that one e ect of opening a container is to reveal things inside that container. The
agent might use this information to nd a ball, b, that unbeknownst to him is hidden in
some container c, by reasoning as follows.
I do not currently see the ball, but I do know of an action which will make
the ball visible, opening the container it is in. The obvious container to open
is the one containing the ball, but the reason I am searching is because I do
not know what container that is. Perhaps I have an independent way to know
where the ball is, e.g. by shaking the container it is in. This is no solution,
since I still do not know which container to shake.
If I now see seven containers, then I may consider that either it is in the
rst, the second, : : : , or the seventh. Each of these things I am able to assume
in turn. Acting on those assumptions will exhaustively search the space of
containers and will nd the ball. Fortunately, the nature of this problem is
that opening an empty container is useful as it permits me to eliminate the
possibility that the ball is there.
Whenever a new container is discovered inside an old one, that discovery
can be easily accommodated since I will do the same thing to check inside it as
with all the other containers.
3

The agent knows the disjunctive proposition that the ball is in the rst container, or
the second, : : : , or the seventh. That information is insucient for the agent to know he
can nd the ball by opening the rst container (or any of the other containers). Section 3.2
presents this formal characterization of ability. However, it is sucient for the agent to
know that the e ect of conducting a search through those containers is to know the location
of the ball (or know that the ball is not located in any of the containers).

1.4 Previous approaches to related problems
The relationship between an agent and his environment determines the kind of plans he
will need to form in order to act e ectively. Initial planning research assumed that the
agent was acting in a blocks world. This section considers planning research which shares
characteristics with mine. None of these research directions adequately addresses the
problem of planning to conduct a search.

1.4.1 Classical planning

Search is a purposeful and conscious activity in which agents engage. A major research
theme in Articial Intelligence (AI) is that purposeful behavior can be guided by deliberate
plans. The prominent paradigm for such planned activity is planning as a state space
search, with the resulting plan being subsequently carried out by the agent. This paradigm
has its origins in the situation calculus of McCarthy MH69] and was originally implemented
as a planner in STRIPS by Fikes and Nilsson FN71].
State space search planning considers an initial state and a goal state. The goal state
describes some future time when the purpose of the plan has been achieved. The initial
state describes the way the world is now. A planner searches for a sequence of actions
which will get the agent from the initial state to the goal state. Following the development
of a plan to traverse a path from the current world state to the desired goal state, the plan
is executed. Because agents have total knowledge of their environment in this planning
problem, the need for conducting a search never arises.
A sequential planner might be used as part of a system to produce search behavior. Let
an agent replan when its environment does not respond as expected. Let it guess which
container the ball was located in. It can plan to nd the ball by opening that container. If
the assumption is correct, the agent discovers the ball when it executes that plan. If the
ball is not discovered in the container, the agent can notice this and replan for the new
environment.
Guessing and replanning are required to adapt sequential planning for use in solving
the search problem. Guessing compensates the planner for not having complete knowledge
of the environment. Replanning compensates for guessing incorrectly. Below I will argue
that plans for search require conditional and iterative plans. The conditional nature of
search behavior is still present in that the sequential planning agent conditionally decides
to replan. The iterative nature is still there in the possible repeated invocation of the
planner. Representing conditionals and iteration explicitly in the plan provides several
advantages. It makes proving correctness of an agents behavior easier by making the agent
modular. It provides a level of representation which completely species the interaction
between the planner and the execution engine (since it is the plan for the entire search).
4

If the planner produces a correct plan and that plan is correctly executed, then the agent
behaves correctly.

1.4.2 Informative actions
In his pioneering work in the theory of knowledge and action, Moore Moo80] dened
informative actions to be those which result in knowledge of the truth or falsity of a
proposition. These actions are like tests with litmus paper. After the test, the tester either
knows that the paper is blue or that it is not blue. From the test result, the agent can
infer other information about the state of the world (whether the solution tested was acid
or base). The nature of tests is that the outcome is not known in advance they have
nondeterministic e ects.
Sequencing other actions after informative actions can be problematic, because informative actions have nondeterministic e ects. In order to sequence one action after another,
the earlier action should have e ects which have more information than required for the
the preconditions of the later action. However, for nondeterministic actions, e ects are
typically less informative than required by the preconditions of any single action. Combining actions using conditional operators or nondeterministic choice is one response to this
problem. (I discuss informative actions further in Section 2.3.3.)

1.4.3 Conditional planning
Relaxing the assumption that actions are deterministic creates new problems for an agent.
Research in AI planning systems has addressed the issue of planning for actions with
nondeterministic e ects by introducing conditional plans. Conditional plans were rst
introduced in Warplan-C by Warren War76]. Recently an approach was suggested for
developing conditional nonlinear plans PS92]. Whenever a plan included an action which
had a nondeterministic e ect, the rest of the plan would be conditional on which state of
the world actually occurred. When the conditional was reached, the agent would examine
the world to determine which branch of the conditional to take.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the interaction with nondeterministic e ects. Supposing action
2 has as its preconditions A _ B . This can be sequenced in a plan after action 1 which
has e ect A. However, to sequence action 4 (with precondition C ) after action 3 (with
e ect C _ D) requires rst combining it with another action in a conditional. A suitable
combination would be to combine action 4 with action 5 which has precondition D. These
short plans are shown in gure 1.1. Note that A _ B is less than A in the information
ordering.
Conditional planning is not sucient for agents with only limited knowledge of their
environment, since the latter prevents them from being able to reliably evaluate the expressions which will decide which branch of a conditional to execute. Conditional planning
might be considered as a solution to the search planning problem provided that additional
restrictions are placed on the expression which decides the conditional. The simplest restriction is to require the expression to be a property of the agent's mental state. This
will be e ective provided that the agent has accurate introspection. The simplicity of this
approach is that it can rely on the simple syntactic marking of a formula as being known
to the agent. Under this regime, acceptable expressions are just those which are properties
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Figure 1.1: Nondeterministic e ects and the need for conditional plans
of the agent's knowledge.
An alternate approach to adopting conditional planning solutions to the search planning
problem is to insert plan steps to acquire information to decide the branch to take. Under
this approach, the planner must be invoked to attempt to construct a plan to determine
if the expression deciding the condition is acceptable. Acceptable expressions are those
which the agent can reliably plan to know.
Since none of the work to date on conditional planning has distinguished the agent's
epistemic state from the actual state of the world, neither of these two approaches to
restricting the conditional expression has yet been explored.

1.4.4 Diagnosis
The goal of a search plan is the acquisition of information about the environment rather
than some modication of the environment. This is a feature that search plans share
with plans for diagnosis RWC92, SW92, MR92]. That actions may both be informative
and e ect changes in the world has been recognized as early as McCarthy and Hayes
MH69] and used in recent work on medical decision support RWC92]. That one may
have to take multiple knowledge-acquisition actions before one's knowledge is sucient
to take decisive action has been recognized in work by McIlraith and Reiter MR92] on
incremental diagnosis.
Plans for incremental diagnostic tests such as proposed by McIlraith and Reiter are
similar to search plans, except that they specically exclude the possibility that the test
actions will change the state of the world. As a consequence of expressing expected test
6

outcomes in a propositional logic, their diagnostic approach does not permit taking advantage of serendipity and nding things other than what one was looking for.
The literature on diagnosis has not addressed the issue of deciding branches of conditional action. However, if one chose to adopt the more general approach to extending
conditional planning to the search problem, existing research on diagnostic plans provides
good models for how to acquire information needed to decide what action to take.

1.4.5 Abstract search actions
While it would be possible to model searches at a more abstract level as individual actions
(as suggested by Schoppers Sch92]), there are at least two reasons for constructing detailed
plans to drive search behavior. First, searches for di erent kinds of objects share a common
control structure which I propose to use as the basis for my representation of search plans.
Second, the actions which must be taken to conduct the search are not di erent from
actions the agent takes to achieve other goals having two di erent ways of representing
the same actions is undesirable.
Schoppers presents a modal logic of time and mental state for application to planning.
He also presents a single-action search operator for locating an object. The application
domain he considers is that of a space-borne robot assisting a human EVA. He represents
abstract search operations. In his planning language, the robot may perform a complete
rotation to acquire an arbitrary object in the eld of view of its camera.
rotating3(X) -- %
b soon sust in-camera-fov(X) <+ true

A rough gloss of the above formula for the rotating3 action is that an unconditional
e ect of this action is that the agent believes that, at some time in the future, the object
X will enter (and remain in) the eld of view of the camera. This is a compact description
of a search.
Clearly, a simple way to incorporate search behavior into existing planning systems is
for the designer of the system to characterize the preconditions and e ects of the entire
search. This abstracts away from the details of how the search is planned and conducted
and the changes in mental state of the agent during the search. It is these issues that I am
addressing in this work.

1.4.6 Planning for iteration
Tate et al. THD90] claim that planning systems exist which plan for iteration. They cite
NOAH Sac75] and SIPE Wil83] as taking a black box approach to construct iterative
plans. To the extent that iterative parts of plans can be abstracted to single actions they
can be incorporated into these plans. The representation system used does not permit
reasoning about the details of the iterative part of the plan.
However, both these planning systems use a procedural net representation which prevents repetition of actions. Drummond Dru85] extends procedural nets to plan nets which
can represent iteration.
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1.4.7 Reactive systems or situated agents
Since the mid 1980's there has been a counter-current in AI planning research which advocates reactive behavior in response to the immediate situation over execution of deliberate
plans. A feature of reactive systems which is emphasized in the literature is that agents exploit features of their environment to reduce their need to deliberate about actions. While
search can exploit features of the environment, the environment is not enough: the environment may be identical at di erent stages of a search. The choice of search action thus
depends on the agent's awareness of what progress has been made in the search. Therefore
search can be used to argue for the need for more internal state.
Current reactive systems and situated agents (with the exception of Rosenschein's work)
are constructed manually for a particular task. When that task necessitates a search, the
designer recognizes this need and manually encodes a procedure for a search.

1.4.8 Monitoring plan execution
The environments where agents carry out plans are frequently unpredictable. This has led
to the suggestion that plans be augmented with sensor actions to ensure that expected
states of the world occur at the appropriate times DAD86]. This is not a di erent planning problem, simply a response to the inappropriate characterization of an unpredictable
environment by blocks world assumptions.

1.4.9 A new approach to planning a search
This exploration of related planning systems leaves me with the conclusion that no existing
system can be used for planning search behavior. The signicant aspects of the search
problem which di er from previously studied planning problems are the acquisition of
information and iteration of similar actions while exploring the search space. Various
systems have been proposed for representing and reasoning about actions which involve
knowledge acquisition and iteration, including Moo84, Les91]. Such systems can be used
to infer properties of plans which have already been constructed, but do not themselves
construct plans for complex actions.
By incorporating information about the agent's epistemic state into situation descriptions and action descriptions, means-end planning can be modied to plan for knowledge
acquisition. Such a modied means-end planning system may be able to incorporate search
into a plan if search is specied as a single action, with a set of preconditions and a set of
e ects. However, planning how to conduct the search requires representing and reasoning
about actions whose outcome the agent does not know. Existing approaches to conditional
planning do not suciently restrict the form of conditional expressions to guarantee they
can be executed in the modied blocks world I consider. After a brief discussion of the
application which motivates this planning problem, I state the claim of my thesis.

1.5 Application to the AnimNL project
The problem of getting agents to look for things has come up in the process of developing
the planning component of a system to produce human gure animation from instruction
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texts. Details of this system, called AnimNL (Animation from Natural Language), can be
found in WBB+ 92].
The problem raised in the AnimNL project is that of reference grounding. Grounding
natural-language referring expressions to objects in a (simulated) physical environment
often requires exploration on the part of the simulated agent to locate them. Information
from the interpretation of instructions will be used directly in forming search plans
In the application of this research to the AnimNL project, the description of the search
object is derived in part from the interpretation of natural language referring expressions.
Descriptions can come from other parts of the interpretation as well, and also from common
sense, world knowledge, etc.
Objects may also be introduced during planning or in reasoning about how to carry
out actions that also need to be \grounded" in the specic environment (e.g. \remove
the lid of the paint can" requires a at-bladed tool to pry the lid o ). Also, instructions
may directly specify that the agent conduct a search to nd an object (e.g. \Get me a
screwdriver").
Search plans are developed in response to an inability of the agent to act. In the
AnimNL project this is detected after the planner has produced an atomic action, but
before the agent can commit to performing it. Commitment is only possible when the
objects required to perform the action are all perceived by the agent. Without the required
objects, a search must be undertaken to locate them.

1.6 Thesis claim
I claim it is possible for automated agents to engage in search behavior. Engaging in search
behavior consists in recognizing the need for a search, constructing an e ective plan, and
then carrying out that plan.
Further, I claim that explicitly representing a plan for an entire search in advance has
several advantages for an agent. The agent has more information about its intentions and
can thus provide better explanations of its behavior. The agent need not replan during
the course of a normal search.
Finally, even constructing a search plan can be more ecient when the entire search
is represented. This is because features common to di erent sites in the search space can
be exploited to avoid redundant planning e ort. Agents who represent search plans as I
suggest can plan and act more eciently than agents that construct only sequential plans
Expressing such a plan and reasoning about its e ectiveness requires a representation
language. I will select a representation language based on criteria derived from analyzing
the search planning problem. Each of the three components of a system for engaging in
search behavior (recognizing a search problem, planning, and executing a plan) will be
designed and implemented to demonstrate that an automated agent can nd things when
he needs to.
The problem of planning search behavior di ers from the planning problems that have
previously been studied. In particular, I do not assume that agents have total knowledge
of their environment.1 I propose a planning system for this modied problem that includes
This assumption is shared with some planners for diagnostic actions, see RWC92]. Rymon's system
does not construct a complete plan at once, and information seeking actions do not need to be repeated.
1
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a logic for reasoning about the interaction between an agent and his environment. I claim
that this system permits an agent to plan e ective behavior in situations that call for a
search to be conducted.
The need for a search plan is recognized automatically when knowledge about an object's location is needed. The abstract characterization of a search plan as a single action
is expanded into a plan that has an iterative control structure. This detailed search plan
species exploring di erent sites in the search space until the desired object is found or
the search space is exhausted. A logic for reasoning about the e ects of various actions on
the agent's internal epistemic state and on his surrounding environment is used to guide
construction of this detailed search plan and to insure its correctness. Correctness for a
search plan requires that no search site is explored twice and that the exploration of all
sites precedes abandoning the search in the plan. (Correctness is discussed in Chapter 3.)
There may arise situations where some element of information is needed by the agent
and is not known to him. This problem has been discussed before in the planning literature
as the problem of knowledge acquisition. Knowledge acquisition actions are inherently
nondeterministic in their e ects on the agent's knowledge state. (If they were not, then
it could only be because the e ects were already known to the agent.) I am restricting
the problem of planning for knowledge acquisition to circumventing obstacles to direct
perception of objects. Actions such as opening doors or lifting the lid of a box have the
potential to reveal objects that were previously hidden. While any action that moves
either the agent or the object being sought or the obstacle that stands between them
may potentially reveal the object to the agent, I am primarily interested in operations on
objects that are conventionally understood to function as obstructions (doors and lids).
I call plans that manipulate these conventional obstructions systematically to reveal the
location of an unknown object search plans.
When the agent believes that a desired object is located in one of a nite set of sites and
needs to gain access to that object for some purpose, a search plan may be employed by the
agent to achieve his goal. The two properties of non-repetition and eventual termination
of the search ensure that when the object exists in the search space, behaving as specied
in the search plan will satisfy the goal of locating the search object.
Reasoning about the e ectiveness of an iterative plan requires reasoning about the termination of the iteration. Agents do frequently have some information about the location
of a desired object which acts to delimit or order the space they are willing to search. This
location information is less than what is needed by the agent. The combination of partial
information about the location of the object and the nondeterministic knowledge e ects
of manipulating obstacles in that search space suggests repeatedly going to some di erent
obstacle in the search space and moving it until they have all been tried { exhaustive
search. Placing some constraint on the search space plays an important role in ensuring
that the search will eventually terminate.
Iteration of the only action whose successful performance cannot be assumed (chest tube insertion) is
handled by an ad hoc mechanism.
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1.7 Plan of proposal
The remainder of this proposal will present the general problem of automating planning,
reasoning about and carrying out physical searches. I present a formalism for representing
search plans which is derived from recent research in reasoning about knowledge and action.
The unique requirements on a representation for search plans are identied and used to
argue against adopting existing formalisms. Chapter 2 presents a formalism for reasoning
about search plans. Chapter 3 discusses criteria for evaluating the correctness of search
plans. Chapter 4 describes constructing search plans by instantiating a generic search
plan schema. Chapter 5 discusses the execution of these plans. Finally, I conclude with
discussion of the remaining work to complete my thesis.
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Chapter 2

Plan representation
Since the previously discussed planning approaches are insucient for planning searches,
I turn to an analysis of the representational needs a search planner. This chapter presents
an analysis of the search planning problem, framed largely in terms of criteria for a representation. After presenting criteria for a logic in which to express search plans, I use these
criteria to analyze previous formalisms.

2.1 Criteria for a representation
A plan for conducting a search should call for repeated selection of some action which may
change the agent's knowledge about the location of an object. The previous discussion
showed some of the failings of existing planning systems in attempting to represent plans
for search behavior.
I argue that the following are required to plan, conduct, and reason about search plans:
1. The representation system should include terms for various objects, to represent the
search object and distinguish it from other objects which might be encountered.
2. Objects are located at sites which should also be represented.
3. Agents perform actions to explore sites. It is useful for the actions to have parametric
description so that an abstract plan for searching an abstract site can be represented.
4. Some representational mechanism is necessary for expressing the selection of a site
to explore and an action to explore that site.
5. Some representational device is required to distinguish what the agent knows and
perceives from what is actually the case (but not known to him).
6. Due to the epistemic nondeterminism inherent in the search problem, some means
of expressing conditional plans is necessary. It is also necessary to represent the
iterative control strategy of a search plan.
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2.2 Indexicality
It is also desirable that the representation of search plans be indexical for eciency and
to reect the appropriate knowledge preconditions of actions. Lesperance Les91] argues
that knowledge requirements for actions are largely indexical knowledge: knowledge of the
environment from the perspective of the agent. In order to open a container an agent need
only know that the container is here (i.e. at the agent's own location). The agent does
not need to know where \here" is in some external coordinate system. Similarly, the agent
need not know the identity of the container except that it is the one that is here.
Lesperance provides indexical functions and operators to change the context of interpretation, which permits him to characterize the di erence between indexical knowledge
and objective knowledge. He further shows that indexical knowledge is usually required as
a precondition for action rather than objective (non-indexical) knowledge.
Lesperance presents an example plan which involves search. He proves that an agent
is able to move to where an object is located if he knows that the object is within some
bounded distance in front of him. The search space for this action is the nite collection of
locations in front of the agent. The action terminates when the agent arrives at the search
object after iterating the action of moving forward one location at a time.
It is the nature of moving forward that changes the agent's physical position. Thus
the nature of the (indexically specied) action means that the agent explores a di erent
portion of the search space each time. Few actions have the property that repeating them
will constitute exploring di erent parts of the search space, and it is only for such actions
that Lesperance's approach will adequately represent a search.
According to Subramanian and Woodll SW89] indexical representations can lead to
more ecient implementations. In particular, they can be implemented in combinatorial
circuits which can execute in constant time. So an indexical representation is advantageous
since it both represents knowledge accurately and a ords an ecient implementation.
Ensuring that the plan is represented in an indexical representation and makes use of
indexical information when necessary is an ultimate goal of my research in search planning.
However, given the existence of a mechanism for translating from a situation calculus
notation to an indexical representation, I consider this of secondary importance.

2.3 Candidate formalisms
There is no lack of formal theories of action suitable for use in this thesis. There are
also several competing formal theories of internal states of intelligent agents. This section
presents an analysis of their relative merits for purposes of representing, reasoning, and
proving correctness of search plans.
In general both logics of action (or change) and logics of epistemic state extend rst
order logic with additional mechanism to make inference depend on a particular time or
on a particular belief state of some individual.

2.3.1 Time and causation

Among logics of change, one can distinguish between logics of time and logics of causation.
Although both have to do with the changes in context as time passes and events occur,
13

change
causal temporal
situation calculus X
dynamic logic
X
event calculus
X
?
temporal logic
X

context
duration
explicit implicit interval point
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Table 2.1: Properties of logics of change
logics of time take times as primitives, while logics of causation take events as primitives
and often do not include times at all. When they do, time is often just an index into a
sequence of events which determines how context changes. Although logics of time can
describe the temporal relation between a cause and its e ect, they require some additional
mechanism to distinguish causation from other reasons for temporal ordering. Conversely,
logics of causation require additional mechanism to express temporal relations between
non-causally related events.
Logics of change may consider times to have no duration (points) or some duration
(intervals), or they may combine point and interval times. The relevance of this distinction
is in specifying the duration (or lack thereof) over which formulas are evaluated. In point
logics, formulas are evaluated with respect to an instantaneous state. In interval logics,
formulas are properties of a span of time.
There are, roughly speaking, two approaches to logics of time or causation. Either
times may be added to the ontology of a rst-order theory or time may be considered an
element of the context which determines the interpretation of formula. The rst approach
results in a rst-order logic, the second in a modal logic.
Having identied relevant distinctions, I will now use them in characterizing the relative
merits of candidate formalisms for representing and reasoning about search plans.

Dynamic Logic Dynamic logic is a causal logic that was invented by Pratt Pra79] for

use in analyzing programs. Dynamic logic is a modal logic, with modal operators for each
action. Because of the way actions are interpreted as modal operators, there are no event
individuals and consequently no quantication over actions in dynamic logic. It is therefore
unsuited for representing plans where the selection of actions is expressed by quantication
over the action.

Event calculus Kowalski's event calculus KS86] permits quantication over events and
relates the truth of propositions and the occurrence of events to intervals. In the event
calculus, intervals are described relative to events, instead of indexically related to the
current time. Kowalski does not include operators to express conditionals or iteration of
events. In general, the only events which are considered are those which instantaneously
achieve a change in the world. Representing complex actions (such as needed in search
plans) in such a framework would be dicult. Thus, it is not appropriate for my purposes.
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Temporal Logic Dynamic logic and the situation calculus have been criticized by many

researchers for restricting the possible temporal relations between actions and between
causes and their e ects. Allen's use of an interval-based temporal logic is one attempt to
overcome these limitations All84].
Temporal logics are a family of logics rather than a single formalism. (For a recent
survey see Van Bentham vB88].) In di erent temporal logics, the world may be described
at instants or over intervals. Both modal and non-modal formalisms have been studied.
However, additional mechanism is needed to express causality in temporal logic, since it
primarily concerned with reasoning about when things happen instead of reasoning about
the e ects of actions. Rather than complicate a temporal logic with additional mechanism
for reasoning about causation, I deem it appropriate to use a causal logic based on the
situation calculus.

Situation Calculus The situation calculus was invented by McCarthy and Hayes MH69]
for representing intelligent actions. In it, doing an action is a relation (or function) between two situations. Situation calculus is therefore classied as a causal logic of change.
In contrast to dynamic logic, it is possible to quantify over actions in the situation calculus.
However, it is a (sorted) rst-order logic not an indexical representation. This makes it
dicult to capture the correct knowledge preconditions of actions.
I expect to overcome this diculty using a technique proposed by Subramanian and
Woodll SW89] to derive an indexical-functional representation from a restricted form of
the situation calculus.

2.3.2 Attitudes
There are rst order logics of mental attitudes, just as there are rst order logics of change.
Such logics formalize the objects of mental attitudes as strings which represent propositions. Similarly, modal logics have been proposed to capture the context dependent nature
of reasoning about mental states. A recent alternative to these two approaches departs
markedly from rst order logic to take arbitrary sets of propositions as constituting situations.
Although there are arguable di erences between these di ering approaches to reasoning
about mental attitudes, they are all more or less suitable for use in conducting searches.
The important point is that some means to distinguish the state of the world from the
mental state of the agent is required.

Syntactic Epistemic Logic A rst-order logic was used by Morgenstern in her work

on reasoning about knowledge and action Mor88]. In her formalism, objects of epistemic
predicates are strings. Functions are included in the logic to manipulate those strings.
Syntactic epistemic logic is most compatible with a rst-order logic of change, such as
the situation calculus. This was the combination used by Morgenstern.
This approach is unwieldy as the functions which manipulate strings must be dened
within the logic, and reasoning about inferences drawn by an agent requires appeal to
the denition of these string manipulation functions. A modal alternative to this will be
discussed below.
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Situation Theory Situation theory was invented by Barwise and Perry BP83] and ex-

tended by Keith Devlin Dev91] and others. Situations are arbitrary collections of propositions and hence may be inconsistent or incomplete. This contrasts with both modal
epistemic logics and syntactic epistemic logics which start from complete and consistent
possible worlds and achieve incompleteness through quantication. Since arbitrary collections of propositions are considered, situation theory does not require that tautologies
be believed nor does it require that beliefs are closed under logical consequence. Indeed,
situations may contain inconsistencies.
Situation theory contains mechanism for representing spatio-temporal locations, so it
alone might be sucient for the purpose of representing search. However, it is fairly new
and less well understood than the alternatives. Since there are no readily available automated inference engines for situation theory, it cannot be considered a viable alternative
on engineering grounds.

Epistemic Logic Hintikka Hin62] proposed modal logics of knowledge and belief. In
epistemic logics, modal context is used to prevent substitution into expressions which
describe the internal state of agents. This approach has been extended to multiple agents.
Epistemic logic is most compatible with modal logics of change, such as the modal
temporal logic argued for above. A consequence of adopting modal logics for mental
attitudes is that tautologies are automatically included as objects of belief, knowledge,
and perception. This is a consequence of the necessitation rule of inference which is part
of all common modal logics. Also, a common modal axiom species consequential closure
of mental attitudes. This is the approach I propose to take for representing the knowledge
of the agent.

2.3.3 Combined theories of change and mental state

Robert C. Moore Moo80] rst provided a logic of knowledge and action along the lines
suggested by McCarthy and Hayes MH69]. His logic combined a modal logic of knowledge
with a situation calculus logic of action. To a basic situation calculus of actions he added
action constructors which build sequences, conditional actions, and iterated actions from
other actions.
Moore's theory of informative actions illustrates the knowledge e ects of an action. An
action is said to be informative about proposition P if, after the action, the agent knows P
and every world accessible (via the knowing accessibility relation) from the world resulting
from the action is the result of doing a similar action in a possible world which was accessible
(again via the knowing relation) in the initial world. To express this formally, Moore
appeals to a rst-order meta-language for his logic in which R is the accessibility relation
which expresses that world w2 results from the occurrence of Event in w1 and Know is
the accessibility relation which expresses that worlds w2 and w3 are indistinguishable given
what Agent knows. The expression True(w P ) indicates that P is true at world w. The
condition for informative actions about P is expressed as

R

8w1 w2:( (Event w1 w2)
! 8w3 :(
(Agent w2 w3)
$ (9w4:
(Agent w1 w4)

Know

Know
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^R(Event w4 w3))
True(w2 P ) $ True(w3 P ))))

^(

Not included in the above formula is the characterization of the lack of knowledge of

P in the initial world w1. When an informative action is successful, there are two possible
outcomes: either the agent knows the truth of P or knows that P is false.

As has been argued by Lesperance, it is indexical knowledge which is the prerequisite
for most action, rather than the objective knowledge which Moore uses in his knowledge
preconditions. Aside from that objection, Moore's formalism addresses most of the requirements of a representation for search plans.
Another approach to combining representation of actions and epistemic state is taken
by Drummond Dru86]. This approach is based on procedural net descriptions of actions
Sac75]. Drummond presents a Petri-net like graph representation of plans which distinguishes between e ects on the external environment and e ects on the agent's internal
state. However, all the preconditions on actions in his representation are on the agent's
belief state. He distinguishes between beliefs which must be present and those that must be
absent in order to permit an action. The approach I propose is more general in permitting
preconditions on either the external environment, or on the agent's internal state.

2.4 Meeting representation criteria
Here I argue that the criteria for a search plan representation system are largely met in
the formalism I propose. The proposed formalism is a combination of a modal logic of
epistemic state (beliefs, knowledge, and perceptions) (Section 2.3.2) with the situation
calculus (Section 2.3.1).
Search plans are represented in a modal predicate logic for time and mental state. This
approach is similar to that taken by Schoppers Sch92]. Using this formalism, I can show
how search plans increase the ability of the agent. In particular, they permit agents to act
in the face of knowledge of disjunctive formulas.
Action selection is managed through a two-stage approach that uses conditional actions
and an action of selecting a site to search from a set of alternatives. Modal operators
maintain a distinction between mental state and actual truth. (Axioms are presented in
Section A.3 to formalize their interaction.) Iteration is represented using an operator which
combines a condition and an action into a while-statement. The formalism is presented
as a logic complete with inference rules suitable for constructing proofs of the ability of
agents to act e ectively. (See Appendix A for more details.)

2.5 Situation calculus examples
The situation calculus is useful for reasoning about situations before and after actions
occur. To represent that ball b is in container c in situation s I will use the formula:
in(b c s)
To represent that the ball is in the container after doing action a in situation s, I use:
in(b c do(a s))
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Plans such as search plans are expressed as actions in this extended situation calculus.
From disjunctive information about the location of the ball in the initial situation s we
want to determine a search plan p such that after doing p in s, the agent will know the
location of the ball. The initial situation might be represented with an existential quantier
as:
9c:in(b c s)
The expression of the goal for search plan p is that the agent know which of the containers
the ball is in. (The next section will explore details of the form which the search plan p
might take to make it possible to achieve this goal.) This might be expressed as:

K(in(b c do(p s)))

9c:

Information may be passed from one action to another by storing it in a variable. Thus
an important kind of action is assigning a value to a variable.1 Assigning the value 3 to
variable x is represented as:
x := 3
Descriptions of actions may be atomic (such as p or a above), parameterized (such
as open(x) below), or they may be complex actions constructed from other actions using
sequencing, conditional selection, or iteration. The system of inference for reasoning about
various actions is presented in Section A.3.1.

2.6 Example search plan
As an example expression of a search plan in this representation, consider the problem
of an agent carrying out the instruction step, \Go into the kitchen and get me the co ee
urn." Suppose, unbeknownst to the agent, the co ee urn is stored in one of several closed
cabinets in the kitchen. When the agent enters the kitchen, he will not be able to see the
urn and will have to look for it, in order to get it for the speaker.
Figure 2.2 shows a search plan for nding a co ee urn (urn) when open(x) is an action
which constitutes steps in exploring the search space. The plan consists of a while loop
followed by a conditional statement. The while loop calls for iteration until either the
object of the search is found or the search space is exhausted.
The success condition is that the urn is perceived to be in some location, c. The term
now in the condition is interpreted indexically with respect to the situation when the plan
is executed. When this condition holds, the plan proceeds to the remaining actions in the
plan which is here described as win.
Similarly, the failure condition expresses that the search space has been exhausted
there are no further actions to explore unexamined parts of the search space. When the
failure condition holds, the plan proceeds to actions which should be taken under those
circumstances (described as lose).
When the search is incomplete (neither success nor failure hold), then actions are selected and taken, and the search plan repeats. Here the container x is selected to open.
An earlier representation formalism used logic variables to pass information between actions. The
resulting formalism required a modal temporal logic. The most straightforward way to pass information in
the situation calculus is to introduce variables speci cally for that purpose.
1
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while (:9
do
begin

c(See(in(urn c now))) ^ B(:empty (sites now)))

x := select(sites)
sites := remove(x sites)
open(x)

end
if 9 (
then

c See(in(urn c now)))

win

else

lose
Figure 2.2: Example search plan

The while-statement expresses repeated execution of the open action. The plan also includes information which constrains the selection of the container to be one the agent has
not previously opened. Once a site to explore is selected, it is removed from the candidate
sites. The open action may have a side e ect of adding new sites to the sites variable. An
initial value for sites is established by examining the agent's perceptions at planning time.
The various operators used in the above expressions include quantiers (9), logical
connectives (conjunction ^, negation :, ), and modal operators (perception See, belief B).
The modal operators are given a possible worlds semantics with accessibility relations for
epistemic contexts (knowledge, perception) and temporal relations.

2.7 A representation language for search plans
I have argued that a modal logic (extending the situation calculus with epistemic operators)
is an adequate representation for the search planning problem. An initial specication is
given in Appendix A. Subsequent discussion of plan construction and execution will make
use of this notation. The point of giving a precise formal semantics for search plans is that
it permits me to be precise about how to automatically reason about how the complex
activity of search is related to its component acts.
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Chapter 3

Properties of search plans
An important aspect of reasoning about plans of all kinds is being able to determine if
a given plan will achieve given desired e ects. I am interested in two di erent properties
of each search plan: that sites in the search space are not redundantly explored (a safety
property, nothing bad happens), and that the search object is eventually found if it exists
in the search space (a liveness property, something good eventually happens). Safety
properties can be veried by invariance arguments as shown in Lam84]. Liveness properties
can be veried by well-foundedness arguments MP82, OL82]. Plans which satisfy these
safety and liveness properties will be considered correct.

3.1 Avoiding repetition
As mentioned earlier, the invariance to prove for the iterated step of a search plan is that
each site is explored at most once. A single execution establishes conditions which prevent a
repeated execution and no other action changes those conditions. Each iteration of the site
exploration action in a search plan should be di erent from all the previous occurrences,
so that the agent does not keep searching the same space. This can be accomplished in
search plans by preventing an agent from exploring a site which he knows does not contain
the search object.
Frame axioms ensure that information obtained earlier in the search will still be known
by the agent at a later time. To illustrate this reasoning, consider that an agent's knowledge
about the location of an object is not lost by opening or closing another container (for all
actions a, situations s, containers c, and objects b):
No actions change location or containment. This is expressed in the form of a successor state axiom:

Poss(a s) ! in(b c do(a s)) $ in(b c s)
The notation Poss(a s) represents that the preconditions for action a are satised
in situation s.
This is known due to the necessitation rule for K:

K(Poss(a s) ! in(b c do(a s)) $ in(b c s))
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Knowledge is consequentially closed (axiom K for K):

K(' ! ) ! K(') ! K()
Assuming knowledge before action a (and a's preconditions hold):

K(Poss(a s))

K(in(b c s))

Conclude: knowledge after action (a):

K(in(b c do(a s)))

3.2 Ability
The literature on knowledge and action formalizes the above liveness property with a
technical denition of ability. This section discusses proofs of ability for various search
plans. The formal denitions of ability which have been proposed by Moore Moo84],
Morgenstern Mor87], Lesperance Les91] share the idea that an agent has the ability to
achieve an e ect by some action when he knows that every way in which he does that
action results in that e ect being the case.1 When \ability" is used in this sense it will
appear in italics (ability). In formulas, the modal operator can() will be used.
An agent is able to bring about a situation which has property ' by taking an action
a in situation s (can( ' s)) when the agent knows that ' is an e ect of action . This
is expressed as follows:

can( ' s) def
= K('(do( s)))

3.2.1 Loop termination

Given a search plan, proving that an agent is able to accomplish some task using that
plan relies on an assumption that the search plan terminates successfully. There are two
avenues I am exploring for insuring that these plans terminate. The rst approach uses a
nite bound on the search space. The second approach places restrictions on the structure
of time, such that only nitely many steps of the iteration are executed. (Lesperance
Les91] takes the rst approach.) These two approaches result in two di erent kinds of
well-foundedness arguments: either the search space is well-founded or the relevant part
of the agent's resources (specically, the amount of time the agent devotes to the task) is
some abstract well-founded structure.

Finite search space It is correct to assume that a search plan terminates when the

search space is nite and the agent does not repeat actions already performed. Finite search
spaces can usually be known in advance before performing the rst step of the search (even
if they are large, as in the case of a combination safe). With nested containers, though,
the fact that an agent perceives nitely many containers at any given moment does not
Note that an agent may still be considered able to achieve some e ect ' if ' is already true and the
action did not make ' false. ' is simply true when the action is done.
1
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c(See(in(b c now))) ^ B(:empty (sites now)))

while (:9
do
begin

x := select(sites)
sites := remove(x sites)
open(x)

end
if 9 (
then

c See(in(b c now)))

win

else

lose
Figure 3.3: Search plan for nding a ball

guarantee termination of the search. Another argument for termination is needed in this
case.
In particular, one can appeal to the fact that the in relation between containers is
transitive and well-founded (meaning that there can be no innite nesting of containers).
Konig's lemma states that any nitely branching well-founded tree can only have nitely
many nodes. So if nitely many containers are perceivable to the agent in the search space
and each contains only nitely many other containers, we can conclude that the search
space in this case is nite. Unfortunately, well-foundedness is not rst-order expressible,
so this deduction will not be automated.

Finite iteration The alternate approach of constraining the number of iterations to be

nite by denition will not be taken in this dissertation. The problem with this approach
is that it is dicult to construct an execution engine for search plans which will respect
this denition.

3.2.2 Ability and search plans
To nd a ball which is hidden inside one of several (possibly nested) containers, an agent
might adopt the plan in Figure 3.3. Here the site exploration action in the search is to
open a new container, x. This step is repeated until a ball b is found or the agent runs out
of containers to open (sites becomes empty).
To prove that agents are able to use the Figure 3.3 search plan to nd a ball hidden
in some container, more must be said about the open action and about the nature of the
search space. To complete the proof requires frame axioms and a description of the current
situation. Frame axioms are needed which specify that opening containers does not cause
the ball to move. The approach to the frame problem I am considering is discussed in
Appendix Section A.3.1.
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3.3 Ecient strategies
A minimal requirement of search plans is that they be correct. Better search plans are not
only correct, but also make good use of time and other resources. Search plans will also
be evaluated for their eciency.
A good strategy for searching is to look in the most likely places rst. An important
area of remaining research on this thesis is to determine sources of information about
ordering the sites in a search space and how that information gets used to ensure ecient
searches.
One potential advantage of using an indexical representation is that it might simply
specify that the search proceed to the nearest unsearched site if the ordering is a \greedy"
decision based on closeness.
Once a site is selected for exploration, it remains to select an action for exploring that
site. The best that may be possible at planning time is to arrange for the type of site to
determine the action.
Future research will explore whether site ordering is best done eagerly at planning
time, or delayed until immediately prior to site selection. I will also study what impact
the timing of these di erent choices has on decisions about actions to explore the selected
site.
An obvious goal for research on planning ecient searches would be to determine when
sucient information was available to permit known search strategies (such as A ) to be
employed. The description of the search planning system I propose is modular, in that it
species where site selection information is incorporated into the plan. More work must
be done to determine precisely what that site (and action) selection information is.

3.4 Summary: Correctness of a search plan
A search plan is correct when its execution leads to the discovery of the desired object
when that object is present within the space described by the search space constraint.
Two components of correctness have been described and methods for proving a plan both
avoids repetition and terminates were discussed. The central concept of deducing ability
(or knowledge of the e ects) of a search plan was also presented.
A search plan is ecient when its execution leads quickly to the discovery of the object.
Determining the order in which sites are explored has a large impact on this eciency and
will be a major topic of future research.
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Chapter 4

Plan construction
Having settled on a representation language to use in the search plans system, I now present
my design for a planner which can construct these plans. Discussion of the correctness of
plans developed by this system was already discussed in Chapter 3.
Iteration is introduced in a plan by schema instantiation. The iterated actions must
be planned for, so the planner is recursively invoked to plan the inside of the loop. Occasionally, there are cases where a search is not yet complete, yet some other action is
appropriate. Such cases can be grouped into two general classes: interruptions where the
search is later resumed, and relativized searches where the search is prematurely terminated. The term \relativized" is borrowed from Cohen and Levesque CL90] where they
consider relative persistent goals. Davis Dav92] discusses an alternative representation for
plans which also supports these kinds of alternatives to completing a search.

4.1 Iteration schemata for search
Generally speaking, search plans should be constructed when the knowledge requirements
for direct action are not met, but there is sucient knowledge to achieve the desired goal
via a search.
Search plans are constructed by schema instantiation. Selecting an algorithm for search
amounts to deciding which search plan schema to use as the basis for constructing the
search. That schema is then instantiated with a description of the search object, a specication of the search space, and actions to take to explore the search space.
Constructing search plans via a schema is similar to instantiating other action descriptions as is commonly done in other planners. The substantive di erence is that only some
of the information is substituted, while the rest is constructed by re-invoking the planner. (The correctness of the resulting search plan can be veried with an inductive proof.
Whether or not this proof is carried out at planning time is yet to be determined.) The
substitution also involves substituting formula instead of simply instantiating variables to
terms. This formula substitution occurs with the search object description and the search
space constraint.
Once the search space constraint and the description of the search object have been
incorporated into the search plan, the incremental actions must be specied. This is
done by setting the search space constraint as the initial situation and the search object
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found ^ :exhausted)

while (:
do

step
if found
then

win

else

lose

Figure 4.4: Search schema
description as the goal situation and constructing a conditional plan which achieves the
goal. The conditions on which each branch depends are taken as successive assumptions
which the plan execution engine must make.
The process of creating a search plan is simplied through the use of a generic search
plan schema (see Figure 4.4) that is instantiated to form di erent search plans. Two
conditions are tested to determine what action occurs next. Condition found indicates
that the object of the search has been located. When it is true, the plan proceeds to
a successful conclusion. Typically this conclusion, win, will be replaced with whatever
action sequence was delayed, pending the agent's nding the object. The failure condition,
exhausted, expresses that the entire search space is known not to contain the object.
When this is the case, the plan continues with an alternate course of action (whatever is
substituted for lose). Otherwise, the schema species that it is appropriate to continue to
search. At each iteration of the search, the exploration of some site in the search space is
specied by whatever is substituted for step.

4.1.1 Interrupting a search
Search plans may be interrupted and resumed due to two aspects of a search plan. Each
iteration of a search plan may be begun in any state. Also, progress in conducting a search
is recorded in the agent's knowledge about the world independently of the search plan.
There are no preconditions on a search plan, except those which may propagate forward
from the actions substituted for step, win, and lose. Preconditions from step may be
discounted if they are incorporated into the exhausted condition. As a consequence, any
iteration of a search plan may be begun in any state since every state will satisfy one of the
three conditions that the basic search plan species (when (:found^:exhausted) explore a
site, when found terminate successfully, otherwise (exhausted) terminate unsuccessfully).
Progress in a search is recorded in the agent's knowledge of the world. When an agent
opens a container, his knowledge about the world is increased by discovering the contents.
If a search is halted, and some other action is performed before the search resumes, the
agent will not have lost his knowledge about the world due to the intervening action.
He may even have gained knowledge about the world. When the search is resumed, his
knowledge of the world determines the course of the search.
Recall that an important assumption about the environment in which search plans are
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found ^ :exhausted)

while (:
do
if
then

interrupt

alternate

else

step
found

if
then

win

else

lose

Figure 4.5: Interrupted search schema
executed is that the agent is the only source of change in the world. Therefore, even though
the intervening actions may drastically alter the world state (e.g., if the agent set re to
the house he's been searching through) the agent can use knowledge of the e ects of his
actions to update his knowledge of the world. This is the sense in which an agent does not
lose knowledge about the world.
An agent may plan for a search to be interrupted using a di erent schema. Figure 4.5
depicts a schema for an interruptible search plan which takes alternate actions when the
interrupt condition holds and then resumes the plan.

4.1.2 Abandoning a search
Cohen and Levesque CL90] provide a markedly di erent approach to rational action than
researchers in the AI planning paradigm. For them, the important issues are committing
to intentions to act in the future and dropping those intentions when appropriate. I take
their point that it may be important to be able to relativize a commitment to any arbitrary
condition and show how to do that in search plans.
Relativization similar to persistent, relativized goals could be formalized by adding
another condition to the existing conditions of a search plan schema. Figure 4.6 illustrates
a search plan with an alternative exit condition labeled relative which when true permits
the agent to exit the search and perform the steps here schematized as exit.

4.2 Recursive planner invocation
A generic plan for exploring an arbitrary search site is constructed by calling the planner
(when the search plan schema is instantiated). This generic plan is substituted for the step
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while (:
do

found ^ :exhausted ^ :relative)

step
if found
then

win

else
if
then

relative

exit

else

lose

Figure 4.6: Relativized search schema
action in the schema. For example, the actions
begin

x := select(sites)
sites := remove(x sites)
open(x)

end

are substituted for step when forming the example search plan of Figure 2.2 (page 19).
The initial state description for this recursive invocation of the planner is an assumption
that the search object is actually located in the site to be explored. The goal state for the
recursive invocation is that the agent has conrmed this assumption. To the extent that
search sites require similar exploration, the planner can plan for exploration of an arbitrary
site in the search space and leave management of the assumptions (one approach to determining which specic site will be explored) to the plan execution engine. Actions proposed
by this recursive invocation of the planner must respect the non-repetition property of the
search plan.
Calling the planner again is motivated by the potential that site exploration may require
a complex plan (perhaps even a nested search plan). For a given container in a search,
it may be necessary to remove something from the top of the container before it can be
opened.

4.3 Planning for a search
This section has developed an approach for constructing search plans when the need to do so
is recognized. An iterative control structure is assumed as part of the schema-instantiation
construction technique.
The modications to a planning system I describe show how to incorporate iteration
into a plan in a principled way. This approach may generalize to principled introduction
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of iteration for di erent purposes, but I am only interested in the principled introduction
of iteration for the purposes of representing a search.
The planning process must also determine an order which will be used at execution time
to select the next site to explore. Section 3.3 described desirable properties of orderings on
the sites in the search space. Just how such an ordering is chosen has yet to be determined.
Because it has an impact on the eciency of the resulting search, it is necessary research
to complete my thesis.
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Chapter 5

Plan execution
5.1 Description of execution of a search plan
To illustrate the execution of a search plan, consider the previous example of an agent
searching for an urn in a collection of (possibly nested) containers. The search plan for
this task is shown in Figure 2.2 (page 19). Initially, the agent does not see the urn
(:9c(See(in(urn c now)))) and there is some unexplored search site (B(:empty (sites now))).
Thus, the search plan directs the agent to proceed with the search. That is to say, the
operational semantics of the search plan species rst checking the condition and then executing the action if the condition holds. Part of the condition is expressed as a description
of the agent's perceptions. This description is checked against input from the perceptual
system of the agent. The other part of the condition for the while loop is a property of
an internal data structure. It is important that only conditions which can be veried by
examining the internal state of the agent (i.e. perceptions, knowledge, or beliefs) appear
in while statements.
The next action in the plan calls for the agent to select some container which he
has not yet visited and open it. The select operation chooses from the available sites in
the remaining search space. The next assignment statement updates the sites variable
to reect this selection. Then the selected site is examined. For the agent to take this
action, he must believe that he can achieve perception of the object by the action open(x).
However, his knowledge is only of the search space, which has less information than will
support that conclusion. To conclude that he can nd the object by this plan, he must
assume that the urn is in the selected container. This assumption is added to the agent's
belief space and belief revision is performed if necessary to maintain consistency of beliefs.
The action open has deterministic e ects on the world { the container is now opened
{ and nondeterministic perception e ects on the agent. After this action, the agent either perceives the urn or does not. The rst case calls for the successful termination of
the search plan. The second case introduces a contradiction in the agent's belief space
since See(:in(urn c now)) implies B(:in(urn c now)). (See axioms for the perception
operator, Section A.3.2.)
The only remaining case of the while loop condition is when the search space has been
completely explored. In such a situation, the variable sites will be empty. In this case,
the plan calls for the unsuccessful termination of the search. The while loop terminates,
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and the succeeding conditional is evaluated. Since the urn is not seen, the lose actions are
selected.

5.2 Evaluating conditional expressions
Conditional expressions are restricted to be properties of the agent's internal state (i.e.
perceptions, knowledge, or beliefs). This ensures that the agent will always be able to
decide which branch of the conditional to take at run time.

5.3 Selecting obstacle/site to search
For the second component of action selection, a search strategy amounts to deciding on the
order in which di erent sites in the search space will be visited. From the perspective of
belief revision, this ordering establishes an order on sets of beliefs which will be considered.
In the process of nonmonotonic revision of the agent's beliefs, a consistent extension of the
agent's knowledge will be selected in such a way as to include at least one of the assumptions
about the site containing the search object. This idea of expressing control information
through justications recorded for the purpose of belief revision is due to Doyle Doy79].
In the previous sections, I have described physical search in terms of the actions an
agent executes to explore a search space. Another way of viewing it is in terms of the belief
revision process. Having a search space in mind can be explained as believing a disjunctive
statement about each of the possible locations of the object. For each iteration, some part
of the search space disjunct (usually just one location) is assumed to be actually true.
Then the agent acts so as to reveal the truth of that assumption. If as a result of that
action the object is discovered, the search is successfully concluded. Otherwise, the world
(and agent's perceptions) are in conict with its expectations, and belief revision must
take place.
In general, belief revision is dicult,1 but the structure of search plans helps to encapsulate a set of assumptions for which I believe revision is much easier. For conducting
searches I identify two disjoint sets of relevant assumptions:
1. Internal assumptions over which the search exerts control
2. Supporting assumptions on which the ability to successfully search is based
Assumptions about the location of the search object are easily revised by selecting other
locations in the remaining search space. Revising supporting assumptions which underlie
the search itself may require abandoning the search. This class of assumptions contain
things like the agent's ability to recognize the search object and beliefs about the e ects
of actions used to explore the search space. (Other assumptions may be revised independently from the search since they are irrelevant to carrying out the search.) I am currently
implementing a belief maintenance system to attempt to exploit this classication of assumptions.
Kean and Tsiknis KT90] show that approaches based on computing prime implicants have at least
exponential worst case complexity.
1
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5.4 Executing a search plan
This section has illustrated the interaction between an execution engine for a search plan
and its environment. The search plan execution engine will make use of a belief revision
system to control the order in which sites are selected for exploration.
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Chapter 6

Thesis
6.1 Review of current state
The problem of planning for and carrying out a search has been presented. Diculties
using existing formalisms for planning and reasoning about conducting searches were discussed. Analysis of those diculties suggested a novel logic which was presented. A simple
approach to constructing plans using this formalism was described. Reasoning about the
plans shows how they can e ectively plan for goals which can not be planned for by other
planners. Finally, a belief revision system was discussed that supports ecient execution
of these plans.
A theorem prover for the modal logic has been implemented. Public domain ATMS
code can be used to support recording dependencies between modal formulas. Earlier
versions of plan execution engines for recursive plans have been implemented (but without
mechanisms to manage agent beliefs and memory).

6.1.1 System Description
The system for planning and conducting searches consists of three functional components
and three databases. Input to the system is a goal to achieve. Output from the system is
search behavior. A rst-level decomposition of this system is depicted in Figure 6.7.
The three functional components include a planner (MODIFIED PLANNER) which
constructs plans, a plan executive (EXECUTIVE) which generates behavior (based on the
plan, world state and agent state), and a nonmonotonic revision component (ATMS) which
maintains consistency among the agent's beliefs.
The three databases include world state, agent knowledge, and agent assumptions.
The agent's internal state is a combination of his knowledge and assumptions. An agent's
perceptions (also part of his internal state) are part of his knowledge. An agent's beliefs
are the combination of his assumptions and his knowledge (his entire internal state). A
database of the world state is maintained, and this is the environment in which the behaviors are executed. Part of the world state database is available to the agent as knowledge.
This knowledge partition increases monotonically over time. An collection of the beliefs of
the agent is maintained separate from (but consistent with) the agent's knowledge.
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PLAN
MODIFIED PLANNER
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EXECUTIVE

ACTION
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KNOWLEDGE

WORLD

Figure 6.7: System Diagram

Planning system The planning component is modied from an existing hierarchical

planner. There are two modications which are required. First, the feasibility of an action
is determined by the agent's state instead of the world state (by PLAN EVALUATION).
Second, hierarchical plan expansion is modied to include expanding an abstract search
into a more detailed search plan (by SCHEMA INSTANTIATION). Figure 6.8 depicts this
organization of the functional component for planning.
Feasibility of actions is evaluated by comparing their preconditions to the agent's knowledge and beliefs. Actions may be known to be possible, known impossible, or have unknown
feasibility. This last category, where the agent does not know the feasibility of an action,
may be believed to be feasible or not (or the agent may have no beliefs as to the feasibility
of the action).
Expanding an abstract search plan is accomplished by schema instantiation and recursive invocation of the planner.

Belief revision and plan execution Nonmonotonic belief revision is managed by an

assumption-based truth-maintenance system (ATMS). Minimally, this system records assumptions and contradictions, and selects among alternative consistent extensions of the
assumptions.
Plan execution is managed by combining an existing plan execution engine with a
programming language interpreter. This interpreter has access to the world state and the
agent state. Only agent state may be used to determine the value of conditional expressions
in the plan. World state is used to determine the e ects of behavior, and those e ects then
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Figure 6.8: Planner System Diagram
become part of the world state.

6.2 Remaining open issues
Whether the complexity of the search planning problem requires the use of an ATMS
for belief revision needs to be more fully explored. Alternatives to managing disjunctive
contexts derived from the search space will be examined, including reasoning by cases as
in a theorem prover.
How the truth maintenance system (if used) will be integrated in the search plan
execution is yet to be completely specied. The options range from using it only to
maintain consistency of beliefs to using it to control selection of the next search site by
enforcing sequential selection of assumptions. In addition, various criteria for selecting
among alternative next sites to explore and alternative actions for exploring the selected
site will be examined.
A major topic of remaining research is determining the ordering on sites in the search
space. What information about the search sites or the object determines which ordering
will be used, and when that ordering is applied to determine which site to explore are
questions which the dissertation must answer. The timing of site ordering and selection
relative to other tasks (namely selecting an action to explore a site) must be determined.
Time permitting, the claim that this representation can be easily converted to an
indexical representation will be demonstrated in the dissertation.
Beyond these technical details, the approach taken to search in this proposal is claimed
to generalize to other kinds of search. The dissertation will demonstrate this generality
by exploring the unmodied mechanism to other domains (such as the search problems
sketched on page 2).

6.3 Remaining software development
Implementing the planning and execution engines for search plans requires modifying an
existing planner and plan executing engine according to the design described in this proposal. An initial attempt at implementing limited search plans used the ItPlans planner
in the AnimNL project WBB+ 92]. To the extent, possible I will continue to use ItPlans
as the underlying planner and plan execution engine which is modied to construct and
execute search plans.
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6.4 Proposed work
To support my thesis claims, I will construct search plans by schema instantiation with
object descriptions, search space constraints, and appropriate actions for exploring the
search space. I will build an execution engine for these search plans to support claims for
improved execution.
For the thesis, I will explore the interaction of a belief revision system with a system for
constructing and conducting search plans. I may use an existing belief revision system for
this purpose, or implement a new one if necessary. Other ways of managing the selection
of alternative sites to explore will also be examined.
The entire process of selecting sites to explore and selecting actions to explore those
sites will be a focus of my remaining research. Information about what sites are likely
to contain the object will be exploited by the planner to attempt to construct ecient
searches.
To support my proposed architecture, I will examine the inherent computational complexity of the search planning problem and the complexity of the system architecture. I
will compare the eciency of my system to a system based on a replanning architecture
which produces only sequential plans.
I will also clarify what inference is done at plan construction time and what (if any)
inference must be done at plan execution time.

6.5 Conclusion
This proposal has identied the changes to the blocks world assumptions which naturally
give rise to the search planning problem. A solution to planning for searches has been
proposed which will permit agents to act e ectively when faced with a need to nd some
object.
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Appendix A

Representation for search plans
A.1 Syntax { rst order modal logic
Individual variables
Functions
Predicates

fv1 v2 v3 : : :g
ff10  f20 : : : f11  f21 : : :g
fp01 p02 : : : p11 p12 : : :g

Terms

T ::= vi j fin(t1 : : : tn )
for ti 2 T
P ::= pni(t1  : : : tn)
j :Pi
j Pi ^ Pj
j 8vi (Pj )
j 2Know(Pj ) j 2Perceive (Pj )
j 2Believe (Pj )
for ti 2 T and Pi  Pj 2 P

Propositions

Note that the action construction operations of the extended situation calculus are
merely functions, and atomic action descriptions are 0-ary functions (constants). No new
syntactic devices are required for the situation calculus.

Abbreviations I adopt the standard denitions for the remaining logical operators,

disjunction (_), material conditional (!), and biconditional($). Existential quantication
is the dual of universal quantication, 9x(') i :8x(:'). Similarly, the diamond operator
is the dual of the box operator, 3R(') i :2R (:').
I use the following common single letter abbreviations for temporal and epistemic modal
operators:

K 2Know
B 2Believe
In addition I will use See as an abbreviation for 2Perceive .
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A.2 Semantics { possible worlds
A model for this logic is an 8-tuple
M = (W Believe Know Perceive I D F R)
where W is a set of worlds, Believe Know and Perceive are relations on W . I is a set
of individuals. D is a mapping from elements w of W to subsets of individuals for that
world Dw . F and R interpret functions and predicates.
My logic has a possible worlds semantics with a di erent world for each way an agent
considers the world might be.
There are three epistemic accessibility relations. The Know accessibility relation is an
equivalence relation. Perceive is reexive and contains the Know relation, Know Perceive.
Similarly, Know contains the Believe relation, Believe Know.1

A.2.1 Situation calculus

The situation calculus is a rst order logic. Individuals may denote situations and actions.
A function do() is used to denote the situation which results from doing an action in a
situation.
Action operators are provided which express control ow among several actions. A
sequencing operator constructs a compound action from two actions.
s = do((a b) s0) $ s = do(b do(a s0))
A conditional operator constructs a conditional branch action.
0 0 if e(now) 1 1

BB BB
e(s0) ! do(a s0) = do B
BB BBB
@@

then

a

else

CC
CC  s0
CA

b
0 0 if e(now) 1

BB BB
BB
:e(s0 ) ! do(b s0) = do B B
B@ B@

then

a

else

b

An iteration operator constructs loops.
00
1 1
00
while e(now)
CA  s0 CA = do B@ B@ a
e(s0 ) ! do B
@ B@ do

a

00
BB
:e(s0 ) ! do @ @

CC
CC
CA

1
CC CC
CC  s0 CC
CA CA

while
do

a

1

1

e(now) C C
A  s0 A

1 1
while e(now)
CA  s0 CA = s0
do
a

As odd as this direction of containment may seem for the accessibility relations, it restricts models to
those which support the axioms given later.
1
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Note that now in the expressions of the conditional and iterative plans is interpreted as
referring to the situation in which that part of the plan is executed (s0 in these examples).

A.3 Inference { modal axioms
The inference system is presented as a Hilbert-style calculus. In addition to the inference
rule of modus ponens, there is an inference rule of necessitation for each modal operator.
The schematic presentation of this rule for the schematic modal operator (for an arbitrary
accessibility relation R) 2R is:

Schema 1 (Modus Ponens)

  ! ' ` '
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Schema 2 (Necessitation rule)
implies that

`'
` 2R(')

Proofs about the e ects of executing nitely many iterations of a search plan requires
some form of induction. Section 3.2.1 discusses alternatives for the structure over which
induction is performed. The two options considered there are the structure of time and
the structure of the search space.
The remainder of the inference system is a collection of axioms and axiom schema.2
Following pages discuss the various axiom collections in more detail.

A.3.1 Inferring properties of situations

Actions in the situation calculus have preconditions and e ects. A predicate Poss of an
action a and a situation s holds when the preconditions for that actions are satised in
that situation. This is expressed as
Poss(a s)
. For example, a precondition for the action of opening a container c is that the container
is closed.
closed(c s) ! Poss(open(c) s)
E ects of actions are described using successor state axioms. The idea of using successor
state axioms is not a new one, and their particular form in this proposal is similar to that
described in Rei92]. Successor state axioms are used to infer for any action and any
property of a situation, whether or not that property holds of the situation following that
action. An example of a successor state axiom is shown for the property of container c
being open:
Poss(a s) ! open(c do(a s)) $ a = open(c) _ a 6= close(c) ^ open(c s)
This can be glossed as stating that container c is open after doing some action a provided
that action was either an open action, or it was not a close action and c was open before
a. (Providing that action a was possible at the time.) Note that open(c) is the action of
opening container c and open(c s) is the property of container c in situation s.
The iteration and conditional action operators require expressions to be evaluated as
either true or false. Each of these expressions corresponds to a formula in the situation
calculus. The expression evaluates to true in a situation when the corresponding situation
calculus formula holds of the situation. For example, the conditional expression
0 0 if in(b c now) 1 1

BB BB
do B
BB BBB
@@

2

then

first

else

second

CC CC
CC  s CC
CA CA

Lowercase Greek symbols, like ' and , are used in schemata to stand for arbitrary formulas.
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will result in the agent taking action first if in(b c s) holds or action second if :in(b c s)
holds.

A.3.2 Static Epistemic axioms
Static epistemic
Knowledge The S5 axioms are validated by the modal operator K.
1. K(' !  ) ! K(') ! K( )
2. K(') ! '
3. K(') ! K(K('))
4. :K(') ! K(:K('))
Epistemic logic Since Hintikka Hin62] modal operators have been used to represent
epistemic attitudes of \knowing that" and \believing that". Frequently, the S5 or S4
axioms are selected to axiomatize the knowledge operator. The Know accessibility relation
is reexive under both these schemes, so the formulas known are always a subset of those
actually true. An intuitive interpretation of the formula K(') is that in every possible world
which the agent currently considers a valid alternative to the way the world actually is, '
is true. Another way to see this is that all the Know-related worlds are indistinguishable
to the agent given what they know.
Common to this approach to formalizing knowledge is an extension to knowing the
identity of objects represented as quantication into a modal context. Thus knowing the
identity of some object uniquely describable as a is represented as

Schema 3

K(x = a)

9x

Perception Since the search plans I am concerned with involve the physical world,

knowledge of successful search completion is typically obtained through the agent's perceptions. Search is not successful if the agent deduces the location of the object based on
having opened all the containers but the last one, since the assumption that the object
is in one of them may prove false. Since containers may be nested, \last" is really \last
currently visible". Search is only successful when the agent sees the object. I adopt from
Davis Dav88] the principle that perceived facts are known, formalized as
5. See(') ! K(')

Belief
6. K(') ! B(')
7. B(') ! :B(:')

Belief is managed outside the system of logic presented here since it must be nonmonotonically revised (see Section 5.3). Beliefs are constrained to contain what is known and
be consistent. Consistency is expressed by the D modal axiom (numbered 7 above).
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A.3.3 Dynamic Epistemic axioms
Dynamic epistemic
8. can( ' s) def
= K('(do( s)))
The denition of the modal operator can is given in Section 3.2 where reasoning about
the agent's abilities to act e ectively is discussed.
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